

77-1542

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April 6, 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Stan:

I can't tell you how glad and relieved I am that a man of your demonstrated capability is in charge at CIA. I very well remember our conversations on the Soviet threat on your flagship in the Med and the brilliantly innovative tactics you came up with to counter the local variety at the time. It gives me considerable comfort to know that that same understanding and approach is being applied at CIA.

I am enclosing an article by General Keegan and a copy of my letter forwarding it to the President, both of which are self-explanatory, and in my view urgent.

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Very sincerely,

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When the Air Force initiated the Advanced Medium STOL Transport program, they were looking for tactical aircraft that could carry large payloads, including oversized equipment, more rapidly in and out of short, semi-prepared airfields. Boeing's YC-14 meets the need to do their job, and we think no aircraft fills the bill better than the YC-14.

Boeing's YC-14 meets the need to do their job, and we think no aircraft fills the bill better than the YC-14.

## Intelligence Analysis

# New Assessment Put on Soviet Threat

(It is very seldom that a bona fide, long-term member of the U. S. intelligence community speaks candidly in public about what goes on in the super-secret recesses of the national intelligence estimating process. Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., recently retired as chief of Air Force Intelligence and a 20-year veteran of varied top-level military intelligence posts, recently spoke to a group of Washington newsmen under the auspices of the American Security Council to provide such a viewpoint. His remarks are published here in full because they deserve close study by everyone concerned about the future security of this nation and the peace of the world. —R. B. H.)

Today I speak as a private citizen expressing my own personal views regarding the Soviet threat and the evolving world power balance. It is a very difficult thing for a member of the military establishment to serve that establishment for better than 30 years, to work in harness with it to weigh what has transpired on his watch and, upon retirement, render public judgment about the adequacy of the Establishment's perceptions of our most serious national security problems. What has troubled me most has been the wisdom

of suggesting to the Free World that its differences are not nearly as effective as might otherwise have been thought.

For in so asserting, one runs the risk of all of the negative, psychological feedback on morale, etc., and invites the risk of rather negative impingements on the foreign security policy arena. I want to assure you that those matters weigh very heavily on my mind.

But in the last five years, in watching anyone labeled "worst-case scenario advocate," who suggested even the most modest real case, I realize that what I have been living as a member of the intelligence community was a part in a Charles Dickens novel. The shocking fact about our intelligence community, with its thousands of able, competent and dedicated people, is that for 25 years, it has consistently underestimated. What the press has heard, in contrast, is a vast mythology about overestimation—citing bomber gaps, missile gaps, overkill, with very few people ever devoting any time to addressing the realities.

A little over a year ago, Dr. Albert Wohlstetter made one of the most important contributions

strategic balance ever published: "Legends of the Arms Race," issued as a special report by the United States Strategic Institute. And he undertook what very few before him seem willing to do. He checked the record and documented the past decade's intelligence—projections of future Soviet strategic force strength. And then for each successive year after the estimate had been issued, he most carefully and rigorously researched the available evidence on the forces that the Soviets had developed and deployed. His principal source was the Defense secretary's annual posture statement to the Congress. He found that without a single exception, the United States had consistently underestimated the development and deployment of Soviet strategic forces.

He found, secondly, that in a substantial number of the cases—better than 75%—the actual Soviet deployments had exceeded the high estimates.

Such a condition has, in fact, existed for the past 25 years of my direct participation in the national estimative process. There is no way that I can describe to you, and have you believe me, what has gone on in perceiving the threat,

It has been my unbroken experience that the [intelligence] community has been wrong about assessing Soviet intentions—granted that that is a very elaborate, complex and Byzantine art. The [intelligence] community has consistently been wrong about its judgments to the national leadership on whether the Soviets were pursuing superiority, whether they could afford to do so, or whether they could in fact pursue such superiority.

The estimates have been wrong about Soviet purposes in detente. The estimators have been shockingly deficient in their assessments of the risks and the advantages to the United States and the Free World of the so-called "technology exchange."

It has been my experience that the real problem of national security, as it relates to some of our higher agencies, is not the so-called skullduggery that allegedly goes on in the pursuit of Cold War aims. If there is a Watergate in this country, and there has been, but ignored, it has been in the monumental, incompetent judgmental processes in this government regarding the nature, character and growth of the Soviet threat as it has evolved from year to year.

I think the matter is unconscionable. Why do I bring this subject up at this time? Very simply. For a number of years, almost alone in this government, I have urged that there be a formal postmortem and audit performed by a disinterested, outside agency or group of scholars who have no professional, private or open links to the intelligence community—an audit on every intelligence estimate that this government has produced since the first NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] was developed many, many years ago. The audit would scrupulously record, trace and track where we have been wrong, where we have been right, where we have fallen short of the mark or where we have exaggerated. That has never been performed in this government save by Dr. Albert Wohlstetter. And he only looked at a small fraction. Now every suggestion that has been made to date by myself and others has been resisted in the most resounding, vocal and emotional way. The vast bureaucracy of the intelligence community does not want to be audited on its record.

Intelligence, an area that I have been in and out of for almost 35 years, is a very imperfect art form; difficult and complex, because unlike many other disciplines, it must deal with uncertainty and faces all the hazards that accrue from dealing with uncertainty. Therefore, there are bound to be honest differences of opinion, honestly different ranges of judgments. It's in the nature of the beast. But over the years, in trying to cope with these hazardous and difficult problems, we have been critical of the wrong sector of intelligence.

That sector is the one that must operate

General Keegan was the assistant chief of staff, intelligence, Headquarters USAF, Washington, D.C., from May 1, 1972, to Jan. 1, 1973. General Keegan is now executive vice president of the United States Strategic Institute, Washington, D.C. General Keegan was born on July 1, 1921, in Houston, Texas. He entered active military service in February 1943. Upon completion of aviation cadet pilot training, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in February 1944. He received his operational training as a B-25 pilot at Columbus, S.C. He went to New Guinea in August 1944 and flew combat missions with the 305th Bombardment Squadron in the South Pacific area where he earned the Air Medal with two oak leaf clusters. He was elevated from active military duty in December 1945. He graduated from Harvard in 1947 and received a masters degree from George Washington University in 1950. In November 1947, General Keegan returned to active duty and served as a B-29 pilot and combat intelligence staff officer in Guam, Okinawa and Japan. In May 1950, he was transferred to Langley AFB, Va., where he served with the Ninth Air Force and later was chief of combat intelligence, Headquarters Technical Air Command. From April 1953 to June 1957, General Keegan was assigned as chief of the Special Studies Group, Directorate of Intelligence, Headquarters USAF. During that period he was the author of several major studies on Soviet science, education and strategy, lectured extensively at all of the nation's war colleges, served as a member of Secretary Stassen's Disarmament Staff in the White House, was Air Force liaison officer for Senator Symington's defense hearings, and later was military aide at the White House. His next duties were with the Strategic Air Command (SAC). He served at Davis Monthan AFB, Ariz., from June 1957 to April 1958, first as a B-47 aircraft commander in the 350th Bombardment Squadron and later as commander of the 360th and 350th Bombardment Squadrons. He was director of operations for the SAC Elson Task Force in Alaska during 1959-1960. In March 1960, he moved to the 303rd Bombardment Wing where he served as acting vice commander and in a number of staff and flying positions. General Keegan was assigned to Headquarters Strategic Air




Command in July 1961 as chief of the Air Estimates Div., Directorate of Intelligence. In August 1966, he entered the National War College, Washington, D.C., and on graduation in July 1966, was assigned to Headquarters USAF in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, as deputy assistant for joint matters, assistant for joint and National Security Council matters. In July 1966, he was transferred to the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as special assistant for joint matters to the directors, Joint Staff. General Keegan was transferred to Vietnam in December 1967 and served as deputy chief of staff, intelligence, Seventh Air Force. In July 1969, he became deputy chief of staff, intelligence, for Headquarters Pacific Command in Hawaii. In August 1970, General Keegan assumed duties as deputy chief of staff, Plans and Operations, Headquarters Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. General Keegan became assistant chief of staff, intelligence, Headquarters USAF, in March 1972. His military decorations and awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit with three oak leaf clusters, Air Medal with two oak leaf clusters, and Air Force Outstanding Unit Award Ribbon. He is a command pilot with more than 3,400 flying hours in both conventional and jet aircraft. In World War II, he flew 56 combat missions in B-25 aircraft in six campaigns from New Guinea to Okinawa. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross by the Republic of Vietnam for his planning of the defense of Khe Sanh during the Tet offensive of 1968.

in the shadowy, hand-to-hand, difficult, complex, sometimes dangerous business of trying to neutralize the opposition's efforts to penetrate your own society, your institutions and to deceive you and to wage war in those subterranean depths normally relegated to the all-essential clandestine services—without which

The real problem has not been in that area. We have excelled, possibly overstepped some bounds from time to time. But by and large the United States has accomplished miracles in a very difficult medium. The area where we are failing is in the estimating process. I'm going to give you won't think that I'm deprived of my





Mikoyan MiG-25 flown by a defecting Soviet air force pilot passes low over Hakodate Airport in Japan before landing. This interceptor version uses considerable steel in its construction, but also was said to have effective vacuum-tube avionics.

senses. When I retired, I expressed some judgments that are in need of clarification. First, I would like to set the record straight regarding the strategic judgments I have reached as a result of my exposure to intelligence.

My first concern has to do with the question of "superiority," a word that is not very meaningful nor very helpful. I would like to make it clear that I think the Free World has an absolutely formidable array of physical power, of psychological strength and economic viability, that no opposing consortium of nations can afford to challenge up to certain of the more dangerous thresholds without entailing some very serious risks. We are a very powerful nation. I want to make that clear.

Now as to the unfortunate question of who is No. 1 and who is not, and the unfortunate use of the loose language associated with superiority, I think the United States is superior in only one major area, and that is in its ability to respond quickly and efficiently to a nuclear initiative by the Soviet Union. And that's where it stops.

What the Soviets have evolved today, in my judgment, is a set of forces structured to a totally different strategic philosophy than our own. All U. S. strategic forces, in contrast, have been premised on a view that nuclear war was so horrible that it could not be contemplated in any rational environment and, therefore, for 20 years or so our philosophy has been that it must deter.

Nuclear war must be avoided at all costs. I have no quarrel with that strategy except that I am unaware in 20 years of a serious-minded scholarly, in-depth attempt to determine what it requires to deter. The American view of what is necessary to deter is based largely on rather loose generalizations regarding the logic of city busting. This logic was created in large part by academics and theoreticians for whom the sound of batter was but an abstraction. The Soviet "mind-set"—documented, and massively ignored by this country until recently—is based on a different set of considerations.

After World War 2, the Soviets put over 600 of their top military professionals to studying the lessons of that war along with the impact of modern technology and atomic weapons on modern forces. Fifteen years after their studies were undertaken, they emerged with a "blueprint," and their findings persuaded them that a nation could survive a nuclear war and emerge successfully. Now that is almost impossible for an American to contemplate.

The Soviets published their conclusions and made them available in hundreds of thousands of pages of some of the most learned and sophisticated strategic literature in modern history. Few in this country would pay attention. That is why a few years ago I began to translate these materials and to make them available to many of you journalists.

Having decided that they could wage nuclear war and emerge with some

advantage—however pyrrhic—the Soviets enunciated a strategic policy premised on the view that war at any level of conflict could be waged, could be won and that they could emerge as a viable controlled, surviving military entity. And that's what the Penkovsky documents were all about.

Oleg Penkovsky, you will recall, was the Soviet colonel who, in the early 1960s, supplied U. S. intelligence with a remarkable array of top-secret documents of Soviet strategic planning—until he was arrested and shot. Regrettably, those remarkable documents—clearly reflecting Soviet long-term plans—have not yet been published and made available to the American people. I think it is unconscionable.


However, you don't have to have the Penkovsky documents in order to understand Soviet strategic planning. All you have to read is Soviet Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky's book "Military Strategy," now in its third edition. It's all there. But when the first edition appeared, high officials of this government—and I know because I was there—went to considerable extremes to try to obscure the thrust of that book and the thrust of its impact on thinking people for fear that it might hurt the evolving American strategy—as conceived under Mr. McNamara and others in the Kennedy Administration. And I'm not going to make any more comments or answer any questions on that allegation, because I don't want to get into a "names-contest."

But I was there and it happened. And it goes on to this day.

The now famous Foy Kohler University of Miami book on Soviet strategic nuclear policy, the greatest single work of its kind ever to appear in the English language, based entirely on Soviet documents, stimulated at least one high official of this government to suggest that maybe this book ought not be published.

As a result of the Soviets having and taking a different view of strategic balance and war-fighting capability in the nuclear age, the Soviets have emerged with an entirely different strategy, an entirely different conception. When we talk of superiority in the United States, strategically, it means one thing to me: that we do have a superior ability to respond very quickly to a warning that an attack is under way and, if we choose, to launch our retaliatory forces before they are crippled. That's a choice that we have, although some would allege that we have renounced that as a form of strategic response, totally.

The Soviets on the other hand, methodically and at a crushing cost to their population, have spent twice as much as we've estimated on defense. Now how much discussion in the press have you heard about this? [Gen.] Danny Graham [former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency] and I did more, I



Soviet Scarp SS-9 ICBM is shown on parade in Moscow. The Russian missile is 120 ft. long and carries a 20-megaton warhead.

think, than any two individuals in this government for the last five years to point out the fallacies of the estimative process which was producing the under-inflated judgments of Soviet defense spending. Now the estimates have been doubled for the period 1969 and beyond.

What I would like to suggest to this group today, on the basis of evidence which I have examined myself, of hundreds upon hundreds of massive Soviet military-related facilities which are not "costed" because their function is unknown, that Soviet defense spending is still grossly underestimated. I'd like to suggest that in another five years from now, when we get through doing all the work that we should have been doing and have not been doing, we will find that the Soviet budgets for the period 1969 and beyond have to be doubled again! I'm not speaking lightly. I have chosen my words very carefully.


Now, what do I believe about relative Soviet fighting capabilities? In my considered judgment, the Soviet Union today has a capability to initiate, wage, survive and emerge from a global conflict with far greater effectiveness than the United States and its allies. That is not to say that if we retaliated in a timely fashion to a

Soviet initiative, which I don't anticipate, certainly not now, there is no question that the Soviet cities would be burned to the ground. When you hear the phrase "they would cease functioning as a viable society," I think that is an unstudied recalling of the language of the McNamara era. It is not based on an in-depth examination of the extraordinary changes which have taken place in the Soviet Union during the past decade.

It remained largely for me—as the chief of Air Force Intelligence, and in almost every case—to surface to the attention of the intelligence community significant new data on strategy, weapons, forces, research and development, civil defense measures, chemical warfare, Backfire bomber capabilities and violations of SALT. In many instances, our Air Force data was ignored, dismissed or taken under advisement, because it did not coincide with the mind-set of an intelligence process that in my opinion has become highly politicized in the last 20 years. It has become a judgmental process that tends to reflect the hopes and aspirations of those in diplomatic leadership in this country. It's a strange process of alchemy, but it has occurred and it goes on.

Some years ago, I was the first, not to discover but to suggest, that certain extraordinary weapons development projects in the Soviet Union, far beyond anything ever undertaken in the Free World, might seriously inhibit or neutralize our strategic potential in the next decade. The response in every single case was a reflection of the American scientific mind-set, which is used in our intelligence community. If you have a problem about an unknown new scientific project, you call in some prestigious like-minded scientists and you get their advice. And since the days of Vannevar Bush, my experience with the U. S. scientific community is that in its egocentricity it is functionally incapable of recognizing that the peasants behind the Potemkin facade are capable of doing something original, and originally creative, and beyond the ken and scope of our own technical capability. Persistently over the years, in our intelligence community in its tragic dependence on advice from our scientists, who tend to know very little about what's going on in the Soviet Union, there developed a propensity for these people to say "no, they can't do it."

Another problem that afflicts the intelligence community is that of the mirror



Sawfly is a third-generation submarine-launched IRBM. The missile has a 6-ft. diameter and is 39 ft. long. It is fueled by solid propellants.

image, in which we persistently try to view what the Soviets are doing in the light of our own logic, experience and strategic preconceptions. All I can say is that there is no way that you can conceivably come to grips with the Soviet Union and understand what is transpiring unless you do it from the Soviet point of view, and it was to break that unfortunate habit that Air Force intelligence moved to obtain the original Soviet writings, to translate and make them available to the American public.

With regard to the intelligence process, there is an unstated rule in this government that in making our judgments of strategic balance we will use only "agreed national intelligence." And what is "agreed national intelligence?" It is intelligence derived by committee, which reflects the least common denominator of the threat and rarely contains a meaningful reference to the dynamics of competition in terms of new weapons, new forces and new capabilities.

The result is that when you estimate today you estimate against a country that has now reached our own industrial stature, that has now reached our level of scientific competence, but that is thought backward in turning out the quality of hardware.

When people talk about technological superiority in this country they are talking about potential and futures that have not yet been bought and paid for, distributed and manufactured and deployed to our forces.

I think a lot of the confusion comes into this area.

Now what are some of the intelligence judgments that have occasioned my views? One has to do with civil defense. There are some who think that I violated security in

calling the nation's attention to information which, in my opinion, has altered the strategic balance in significant if not decisive ways. Almost anyone else can divulge the results of a lifelong study of the Soviet Union with impunity, but a military officer cannot whether he is retired or active. Now what I divulged was not sensitive.

It was widely known, and there was an enormous wealth of neglected unclassified literature to document it. But who would go out to the Soviet Union and travel and buy this literature in their newspapers and the thousands of photographs contained in those newspapers and periodicals and pamphlets which exist in the thousands in the Soviet Union?

What I discussed were the judgments that emerged from this process, protecting sources, protecting methods and, therefore, I don't think that I did anything other than render a service not only to the leaders of this government, who were totally ignorant and still are about the subject, and to the professional staffs, which are still very ignorant about the subject, but to a greater degree the service was rendered to the American public.

Now what are the facts? Very simply, the Soviets upon their determination that a nation could be made survivable undertook the greatest war survival/civil defense program in history. Bear in mind this is a country that lost half of its cities in World War 2, lost between 20 million and 40 million people killed or wounded, and whose leaders destroyed some 20 million to 40 million of their own people in a succession of purges. These are a very tough people.

What they have done over the past 20 years is to place the Soviet Union underground and to remove those strategic

economic, population-industrial command assets that are essential to prevail in war from our ability to cripple. I say and will challenge any military or congressional body of this government to disprove what I am about to say:

The United States today lacks the firepower, lacks the accuracy and lacks the yields to overcome the enormous advantage in terms of neutralizing our retaliatory punch which the Soviets have engineered for themselves at great cost. They have removed their civilian leadership from our ability to cripple it. They have removed their military command and control from our ability to destroy or cripple. The nuclear chain of command from the General Staff to the lowest regiment is now beyond the reach of American retaliatory weapons. There is no physical way that we can destroy underground installations which now exist in the tens of thousands, that are now 1,000-2,500 psi. blast hardened—the hardest man-made structures in the world. They have put their strategic communications underground. They have put their nuclear weapons underground. They have hardened most of their fighting capabilities—particularly in the defense area.

The entire industrial population of the Soviet Union, it would seem from the evidence which we examined, and the human sources we spoke to, are now 100% protected. Every daytime working industrial shift in the Soviet Union has within a few feet a vast underground bunker hardened to 145 psi. Now unless you get a direct hit against one of these, the incumbents or the occupants are going to survive, and that's precisely what the Soviets have done.

Finally, much to my chagrin, this country has for many years neglected



doing quality research on Soviet civil defense. This country went into civilian defense studies with a mind-set, not believing that it was going on and not taking it seriously. The result was that no one did the research and it was left for us. We've got years more to do. The Soviets realized in the late 1950s that they couldn't hope to evacuate their populations in a meaningful way. What we found, and what triggered our interest, were Soviet regulations published as late as 1960, specifying in detail that every new urban building must have a shelter in the basement built to specifications that protect the population—not from a direct burst, but from a nearby burst and nuclear effects.

The evidence which my small staff has since uncovered leaves little doubt in my mind that they have succeeded in protecting the bulk of their civil population—in place—against all but a direct nuclear hit. While I appreciate that years of additional study will be required by our ostrich-like econometricians to measure every impact, I made a judgment call. The time to warn our people and leaders was now. And I issued such a warning and I think it was in the public interest that I do so. I hope I've stimulated sufficient people. I know I have angered many in this government. I hope that I've provoked them enough to the point where they will dedicate some analysts to research the data which they had ignored. That's all that I'm trying to do.

I say to you now, in my judgment, that the Soviets through their hardening, war survival and civil defense measures, have neutralized the ability of our retaliatory forces to carry out their directed tasks. That does not mean that we could not burn every Soviet city to the ground. We could. And I find it hardly likely that the Soviet Union at this time would take that risk, or encourage such an incredible wrath that would be inflicted on its population. I also find it morally repugnant to have abandoned the traditional mission of military

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threats and now turn to holding civil populations in hostage.

Do not for a moment doubt the consequences! In 1969, we premised our arms control negotiations on the one clearly erroneous assumption, that the Soviets would seek no more than parity. And finally, in 1972—based on a totally politicized civil defense study of 1970 (which found no serious evidence of CD)—we concluded an ABM treaty premised on an explicit agreement that neither side would defend its civil populations—thus holding each hostage to the nuclear threat. Yet even a cursory examination of the "hard" intelligence would have confirmed what remained for me to expose.

Secondly, there have been a number of problems in the estimates that have to do with hardware and forces. Remarks were attributed to me about my not knowing of any area where the Soviets did not have a strategic advantage. What I said, and what I meant, and what I say here today is that in every important area that is meaningful to strategic balance in terms of combat kill effectiveness, I know of no single major advantage which the United States retains.

And when people tell me that we have greater accuracy, my response is "yes, we have more accurate weapons. Not much greater in accuracy than do the Soviets, but what have we done with our accuracy? We have imposed self-restraint and have reduced the amount of firepower and yield. And so those weapons, while efficient, don't really do an awful lot more."

Also, the Soviet target base has been doubling almost every 10 years—the most explosive military growth in history. We have not been keeping pace. People say or take comfort in the fact that we have MIRV. What have we done with our MIRVs? Gone to smaller yields and increased the accuracy problem. We have not really tested their operational reliability. What they can do well is to burn cities,

and that's where it stops. Meanwhile, we have long since run out of nuclear weapons with which to destroy the bulk of the USSR's ground divisions and reserves.

We have been told that we have a vastly superior bomber payload. For 15 years as a member of this intelligence community, I watched the accountants make some 800 Soviet medium bombers disappear from the strategic equation. Most of these have the same one-way intercontinental capability our medium bombers had and were required to fly. I know. I used to practice one-way missions in them. Same capability, most of them, that our medium bombers had, which I once flew. We were practicing one-way missions and targets.

It is considered worst-case to consider that in anything as horrible as global conflict, the Soviets would not do what is realistic by using all of their forces. Well, the case of the bomber payload question is one of how you do your bookkeeping and what you exclude from it. We have no advantage in bomber payload, let me assure you, when you look at the realities.

Now what else is ignored? Refire. Every year for the last five years I have dissented in the manner in which the United States has ignored the intercontinental ballistic missile refire capability of the Soviet Union. To this day I cannot understand the emotional heat that every attempt to consider the evidence on refire has generated.


We discovered in 1961 or 1962, if not the first certainly the second generation ICBM, the SS-7, was designed for refire. When we introduced this evidence and this subject we were laughed out of court.

"No way. It doesn't make sense."

We were looking at it from our strategic point of view, where we were deterring and avoiding war.

Well, some 3-4 years later, a couple of us acquired some hard, incontrovertible evidence that each SS-7 missile on a launch pad had four missiles in nearby





SS-1C Scud B missiles are shown in Red Square. The missiles can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads. (UPI Photo)

hardened storage for refire purposes. So the community then went to "well maybe they have the capability to refire one and at most two." The fact of the matter was that each ICBM had at least four additional ICBMs for refire capability, which under their nuclear war doctrines make great sense.

Every intermediate, every medium-range and every battlefield ballistic missile system has been designed with such a refire point in mind. Now the Soviets are deploying four new land-based missile systems, three we know of definitely. Two of these have a cold-launch technique which I was the first to report in this country. The community has steadfastly, on emotional grounds in my opinion, refused to treat the refire capability. The Soviets picked up a Boeing design, thanks to Robert Hotz. We didn't want it so Bob published it [in AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY]. Why not? The Soviets picked it up, proved it, and today there are two types of their silo-based, cold-launch missiles in which the main engine ignition occurs outside the silo and does no damage to the silo. They can lower another missile in a canister in that silo and refire it, if not in minutes, in just a very few hours. Now the silos are too hard for us to destroy, so a great many more are going to survive.

My suggestion is that today the Soviets have somewhere between 500 and 3,000 additional ICBMs that can be refired which are totally ignored in discussions of the strategic balance. I think that's a national estimate and in the public and in the congressional testimony.

There are a couple of others that are equally serious. One was the Backfire. You all know the rhubarb I've been through on that one so I won't belabor the fact. I did go to Boeing, North American Rockwell, General Dynamics and the [British] Royal Air Force, to everyone in the Free World who had any experience in the design and the construction of heavy strategic bombers. I gave them our intelligence and I said you tell me what this bomber is capable of. Every single one of these agreed that the Backfire had an intercontinental capability. You don't have to know anything else. But my word was not good enough. The word of American and British industry was not good enough. Someone had to believe the Soviet statement to us that the Backfire did not have an ability to strike the United States. And so the estimates have "yo-yoed" back and forth. Those closest to detente and those closest to SALT have argued with a polemical fury that I have never experienced in my professional career. I would never have been allowed in the military to survive for one day on such estimates unless they were ground in fact and careful analysis. I'm not going to say anything more about the Backfire, except that it does have an intercontinental capability. How the Soviets use it is another matter. When the proof was so overwhelming the intelligence community did a sudden shift. They said "well the Soviets have no intent to so use it." Yet the second Backfire model, the B-model, to clean it up, to streamline it, to assure that

it would have a great deal more range. I suspect there is a third Backfire model which will appear shortly with even greater range. That's part of the problem you have in the intelligence community.

CIA's final super-secret uncoordinated effort, in concert with an innocent fighter manufacturer, to reduce the range of the Backfire bomber, represents one of the most artful contrivances I have ever observed. It is one which I suspect—and as reported in AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY—may have been designed to salvage a SALT II accord.

Now, on force levels, what concerns me most in the tactical area has been the continued assertion that we can defend NATO. I won't go into and belabor the psychological points there. I think I have devoted as much time as any individual in the government of the United States to the study of Soviet literature, in the study of their exercises and in the monitoring of the development and improvement of their Warsaw Pact forces.

That's not a very great claim, incidentally. I find that there was a very distinctive change in Soviet strategy which occurred prior to 1970 in the NATO-Warsaw Pact area. I regrettably had to deduce this by inference, by examining the doctrines, by examining their literature, by studying their exercises and by looking at the new weapon equipment.

Rather than boring you with the details, I'll just simply express my judgment: I think that a Soviet war planner today, in the Warsaw Pact, given the forces, the capabilities, the combined arms doctrines

have said, "I've got to neutralize that other man's ability to control, deploy, and command his forces," and that's what I'm doing. That doesn't surprise me.

In a simple, straightforward way, the Soviets have prepared to deny the U. S. its use of space—without which, it cannot be warned, nor deploy and employ its forces.

Finally, you're aware of something through some newspaper accounts of the last few weeks that I'm really not at liberty to expand upon. But let me lay it out for you. The Soviet Union, irrespective of what any scientist in this country tells you, since I have done more work on this subject than any living official in this country is 20 years ahead of the United States in its development of a technology which they believe will soon neutralize the ballistic missile weapon as a threat to the Soviet Union. It is my firm belief that they are now testing this technology. For five years the intelligence community has said: "No, Keegan, you're wrong. Our scientists say it is not possible." Our scientists never really tried. Our scientists haven't done the basic research. It was left to my little organization to undertake the most advanced basic research, or sponsor it, since the development of the A-bomb, to prove to these people in our community that what the Soviets have been writing about for 15 years they are in fact able to do and are doing. And I submit that the Soviets, on the basis of what I have examined, have every expectation that well before 1980, if they don't blow themselves up—and they may—will perceive that they have technically and scientifically solved the problem of the ballistic missile threat.

Look what they did to neutralize the bomber. Look what they did to deploy the world's greatest defenses. Don't be surprised. They view defense and offense and diplomacy and subversion in one grand context of being able to do it better. Now I have half a dozen more such examples and I'm not going to go into them.

The intelligence community was wrong about parity. The intelligence community has been wrong about virtually every great Soviet scientific, military advance since World War 2. The intelligence community was wrong about the A-bomb. Only the United States Air Force correctly predicted when the Soviets would have an A-bomb.

The intelligence community was wrong about the thermonuclear weapon. The intelligence community was wrong about whether the Soviets would have an ICBM. Now when I say they were wrong, predictions usually have occurred only on the eve of the event. But we can't operate with lead times like that in this environment.

The intelligence community was consistently wrong in its assessment of the development of the broad base of Soviet science. Today, look at the quality of Soviet weapons being deployed. I have examined more Soviet weapons than most

Crude, by our standards, maybe.

Not polished, by our standards, maybe. Difficult to operate, by our standards maybe.

But in terms of net lethal killing effectiveness, within the combined arms doctrines of using night, deception, nerve gas jamming and blitz warfare on a scale never before contemplated by anyone in the Free World, he doesn't have to have our kind of F-15s. He doesn't have to have our kind of costly close air support.

This is the thrust of my concerns. Persistent underestimation; diminution of our retaliatory punch through an unperceived war survival effort of unprecedented scope; anti-satellite weapons to deny our use of space for warning and command; pioneering research in directed energy weapons to kill our retaliatory missiles; an omnipotence on land; an ability to deny our use of the seas and a continuing projection of power into the Third World representing the greatest imperialism in history. Deny the reality if you will. I cannot.

My last word before you throw me out of here is I'd like to caution that we do have great strengths in this country and that we're not on the edge of the abyss. But because of the failure in our perceptions, I think that a global conflict is now in gestation. Sometime in the future such a conflict is more likely than not to occur. I think the Soviets believe that principally because of what they are doing and what we are not doing. Now we don't have to stand this country on its head to avert another mindless and needless holocaust. We are dedicated to preventing that, but we are not doing what we should.

I disagree totally with those who hold that the Soviets are destined to be the world's leading superpower; that they are destined to far outpace the United States as a strategic power, and that there is nothing we can do about it, and that the sooner we resign ourselves to getting the American people to accept that fact of life and adjust to that fact of life through a more enlightened and rational diplomacy in which we—well I'm not going to spell it out for you. I think that is an odious and foreign doctrine ignorant of the traditions under which this country was built, and how its forests were cleared, and its industries set up. This country, its creative genius, its great wealth, its unmatched industrial know-how, but for the cost of a few gallons of gasoline per person per year in this country, can assure that the Soviets will never be tempted (as these new weapons give them a heightened sense of security) to challenge the basic institutions and worth of the Free World.

I think what we have is too precious to put to that risk. I don't want it to be in an area of doubt on a range of uncertainty in a national intelligence estimate process that has not been able for the last 10 years to determine whether the Soviets were seeking parity or not. That would be quite uncon-

Soviet SS-9 ballistic missile is launched from an operational site in Russia. Distinctive nose cone and paint markings indicate that it is a test firing.

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## EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
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2	DDCI				
3	D/DCI/IC				
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/NI	✓			
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/S				
15	DTR				
16	Asst/DCI				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
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